Blame packages/q/qemu/ui-vnc-clipboard-fix-integer-underflow-i.patch

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From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
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Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 22:45:11 +0200
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Subject: ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext
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Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4,
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an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is
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used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to
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CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in
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protocol_client_msg.
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Fixes: CVE-2022-3165
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Fixes: 0bf41cab93e5 ("ui/vnc: clipboard support")
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Reported-by: TangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com>
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Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
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Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit d307040b18bfcb1393b910f1bae753d5c12a4dc7)
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Resolves: bsc#1203788
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Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
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---
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 ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++---
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 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
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index 6a05d061479e3bc38148e4647426..acb3629cd8e2643ff82e72d958dc 100644
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--- a/ui/vnc.c
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+++ b/ui/vnc.c
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@@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
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         if (len == 1) {
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             return 8;
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         }
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+        uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
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         if (len == 8) {
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-            uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
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             if (dlen > (1 << 20)) {
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                 error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes"
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                              " which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen);
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@@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
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         }
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         if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) {
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-            vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)),
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-                                    read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
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+            if (dlen < 4) {
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+                error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)"
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+                             " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding.");
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+                vnc_client_error(vs);
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+                break;
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+            }
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+            vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
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             break;
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         }
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         vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);