From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:57:38 -0600

Subject: KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command

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Patch-mainline: v4.16-rc1

Git-commit: 9f5b5b950aa96b3d303d132e069f93c8bc4c9b58

References: bsc#1063068

The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>

Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>

Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>

Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Cc: x86@kernel.org

Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org

Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

---

 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |   68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c

+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c

@@ -6416,6 +6416,71 @@ err:

 	return ret;

 }

+static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)

+{

+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;

+	struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;

+	struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;

+	struct page **pages;

+	void *blob, *hdr;

+	unsigned long n;

+	int ret;

+

+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))

+		return -ENOTTY;

+

+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))

+		return -EFAULT;

+

+	pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);

+	if (!pages)

+		return -ENOMEM;

+

+	/*

+	 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify

+	 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.

+	 */

+	if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {

+		ret = -EINVAL;

+		goto e_unpin_memory;

+	}

+

+	ret = -ENOMEM;

+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);

+	if (!data)

+		goto e_unpin_memory;

+

+	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);

+	if (IS_ERR(blob)) {

+		ret = PTR_ERR(blob);

+		goto e_free;

+	}

+

+	data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);

+	data->trans_len = params.trans_len;

+

+	hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);

+	if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {

+		ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);

+		goto e_free_blob;

+	}

+	data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);

+	data->trans_len = params.trans_len;

+

+	data->handle = sev->handle;

+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);

+

+	kfree(hdr);

+

+e_free_blob:

+	kfree(blob);

+e_free:

+	kfree(data);

+e_unpin_memory:

+	sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);

+	return ret;

+}

+

 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)

 {

 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;

@@ -6454,6 +6519,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kv

 	case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:

 		r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);

 		break;

+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:

+		r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);

+		break;

 	default:

 		r = -EINVAL;

 		goto out;