diff --git a/patches.suse/x86-speculation-warn-about-spectre-v2-lfence-mitigation.patch b/patches.suse/x86-speculation-warn-about-spectre-v2-lfence-mitigation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0142b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches.suse/x86-speculation-warn-about-spectre-v2-lfence-mitigation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:31:49 -0800
+Subject: x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
+Git-commit: eafd987d4a82c7bb5aa12f0e3b4f8f3dea93e678
+Patch-mainline: v5.17 or v5.17-rc8 (next release)
+References: bsc#1191580 CVE-2022-0001 CVE-2022-0002
+
+With:
+
+  f8a66d608a3e ("x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd")
+
+it became possible to enable the LFENCE "retpoline" on Intel. However,
+Intel doesn't recommend it, as it has some weaknesses compared to
+retpoline.
+
+Now AMD doesn't recommend it either.
+
+It can still be left available as a cmdline option. It's faster than
+retpoline but is weaker in certain scenarios -- particularly SMT, but
+even non-SMT may be vulnerable in some cases.
+
+So just unconditionally warn if the user requests it on the cmdline.
+
+  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+index a36bfe2c2480..cfd116423908 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+@@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+ #endif
+ 
++#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+ #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+@@ -972,6 +973,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
++		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+ 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
+ 		break;
+ 
+@@ -1787,6 +1789,9 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
+ 
+ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+ {
++	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
++		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
++
+ 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ 		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
+ 
+
diff --git a/series.conf b/series.conf
index 95d0666..8ce7874 100644
--- a/series.conf
+++ b/series.conf
@@ -8272,6 +8272,7 @@
 	patches.suse/documentation-hw-vuln-update-spectre-doc.patch
 	patches.suse/x86-speculation-include-unprivileged-ebpf-status-in-spectre-v2-mitigation-reporting.patch
 	patches.suse/x86-speculation-use-generic-retpoline-by-default-on-amd.patch
+	patches.suse/x86-speculation-warn-about-spectre-v2-lfence-mitigation.patch
 
 	# jejb/scsi for-next
 	patches.suse/scsi-smartpqi-Add-PCI-IDs