From: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 13:26:15 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] kABI: revert change in struct bpf_insn_aux_data

References: bsc#1188983, bsc#1188985, CVE-2021-34556, CVE-2021-35477
Patch-mainline: never, kABI

Revert sanitize_stack_spill to sanitize_stack_off since they're use in
pretty much identical way.
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |    2 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
 		u32 alu_limit;			/* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
 	};
 	int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
+	int sanitize_stack_off; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */
 	bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
-	bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */
 	u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
 };
 
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_
 		}
 
 		if (sanitize)
-			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true;
+			env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off = 1;
 	}
 
 	if (value_regno >= 0 &&
@@ -5981,7 +5981,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
 		}
 
 		if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
-		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) {
+		    env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) {
 			struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
 				*insn,
 				BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),