From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 13:46:25 +0100
Subject: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
Patch-mainline: v4.16-rc3
Git-commit: 57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
References: CVE-2018-1065 bsc#1076830 bsc#1083650
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
---
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 7 ++++++-
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index 0bc3c3d73e61..11726a2e2c9f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -257,6 +257,10 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (table_base + v
!= arpt_next_entry(e)) {
+ if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+ verdict = NF_DROP;
+ break;
+ }
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 2a55a40211cb..b3b49c07b7af 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -341,8 +341,13 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
continue;
}
if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) &&
- !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO))
+ !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) {
+ if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+ verdict = NF_DROP;
+ break;
+ }
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
+ }
e = get_entry(table_base, v);
continue;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 1f90644056ac..7d2228be6fa5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -363,6 +363,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
+ if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+ verdict = NF_DROP;
+ break;
+ }
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
--
2.16.2