From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 10:00:14 -0500
Subject: x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
Git-repo: tip/tip
Git-commit: 7c3658b20194a5b3209a143f63bc9c643c6a3ae2
Patch-mainline: Queued in a subsystem tree
References: bsc#1111331, CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091
arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS
mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions
have been made.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 9f252082a83b..3f934ffef8cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
mds_select_mitigation();
+ arch_smt_update();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -638,9 +640,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
-
- /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
- arch_smt_update();
}
static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)