From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 16:46:43 +0200
Subject: xdp: avoid leaking info stored in frame data on page reuse
Patch-mainline: v4.18-rc1
Git-commit: 6dfb970d3dbd6bf274c4bf003ca8ab4a51dc66c7
References: bsc#1109837
The bpf infrastructure and verifier goes to great length to avoid
bpf progs leaking kernel (pointer) info.
For queueing an xdp_buff via XDP_REDIRECT, xdp_frame info stores
kernel info (incl pointers) in top part of frame data (xdp->data_hard_start).
Checks are in place to assure enough headroom is available for this.
This info is not cleared, and if the frame is reused, then a
malicious user could use bpf_xdp_adjust_head helper to move
xdp->data into this area. Thus, making this area readable.
This is not super critical as XDP progs requires root or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which are privileged enough for such info. An
effort (is underway) towards moving networking bpf hooks to the
lesser privileged mode CAP_NET_ADMIN, where leaking such info
should be avoided. Thus, this patch to clear the info when
needed.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
---
net/core/filter.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2686,6 +2686,7 @@ static unsigned long xdp_get_metalen(con
BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_head, struct xdp_buff *, xdp, int, offset)
{
+ void *xdp_frame_end = xdp->data_hard_start + sizeof(struct xdp_frame);
unsigned long metalen = xdp_get_metalen(xdp);
void *data_start = xdp->data_hard_start + metalen;
void *data = xdp->data + offset;
@@ -2694,6 +2695,13 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_xdp_adjust_head, struct x
data > xdp->data_end - ETH_HLEN))
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Avoid info leak, when reusing area prev used by xdp_frame */
+ if (data < xdp_frame_end) {
+ unsigned long clearlen = xdp_frame_end - data;
+
+ memset(data, 0, clearlen);
+ }
+
if (metalen)
memmove(xdp->data_meta + offset,
xdp->data_meta, metalen);