From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 01:19:03 -0500
Subject: ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid
action
Patch-mainline: v5.9-rc1
Git-commit: 712183437ebebc89cd086ef96cf9a521fd97fd09
References: jsc#SLE-15209
Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can
only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores
all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of
policy load.
The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it
was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the
hook function and not the keyrings conditional since
"appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.
Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -972,6 +972,43 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const
#undef MSG
}
+static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ /* Ensure that the action is set */
+ if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
+ * components of the rule
+ */
+ switch (entry->func) {
+ case NONE:
+ case FILE_CHECK:
+ case MMAP_CHECK:
+ case BPRM_CHECK:
+ case CREDS_CHECK:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
+ case MODULE_CHECK:
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+ case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+ case POLICY_CHECK:
+ /* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+ case KEY_CHECK:
+ if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+ return false;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1149,7 +1186,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, st
keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
if ((entry->keyrings) ||
- (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
(entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
(keyrings_len < 2)) {
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1355,7 +1391,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, st
break;
}
}
- if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
+ if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
result = -EINVAL;
else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);