From 9f18a841939777c6a34d930eab2be37d53a12351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 16:23:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Support the old-style signature format
References: fate#319460
Patch-mainline: Never, SLE12 specific
... to be compatible with SLE12 tools. This is a partial revert of
3f1e1bea3474 ("MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures").
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
---
kernel/module_signing.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 232 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 6528a79d998d..48ede9f3dd03 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -26,15 +29,18 @@
* - Information block
*/
struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0|enum pkey_algo] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0|enum hash_algo] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7|PKEY_ID_X509] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name (PKEY_ID_X509 only) */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier (PKEY_ID_X509 only) */
u8 __pad[3];
__be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
};
+static int old_mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen,
+ const struct module_signature *ms);
+
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
@@ -50,6 +56,17 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
modlen -= sizeof(ms);
+ *_modlen = modlen;
+
+ switch (ms.id_type) {
+ case PKEY_ID_PKCS7:
+ break;
+ case PKEY_ID_X509:
+ return old_mod_verify_sig(mod, _modlen, &ms);
+ default:
+ pr_err("Module is not signed with expected signature type\n");
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
if (sig_len >= modlen)
@@ -57,11 +74,6 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
modlen -= sig_len;
*_modlen = modlen;
- if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
- pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n");
- return -ENOPKG;
- }
-
if (ms.algo != 0 ||
ms.hash != 0 ||
ms.signer_len != 0 ||
@@ -76,3 +88,213 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
}
+
+/*
+ * pre-4.3 compat stuff
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Digest the module contents.
+ */
+static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum hash_algo hash,
+ const void *mod,
+ unsigned long modlen)
+{
+ struct public_key_signature *pks;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
+
+ desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
+ * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
+ */
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pks)
+ goto error_no_pks;
+
+ pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
+ pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
+ pks->digest_size = digest_size;
+
+ desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+ desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
+ return pks;
+
+error:
+ kfree(pks);
+error_no_pks:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual
+ * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the
+ * size of the MPI in bytes.
+ *
+ * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one.
+ */
+static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t nbytes;
+ MPI mpi;
+
+ if (len < 3)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1];
+ data += 2;
+ len -= 2;
+ if (len != nbytes)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes);
+ if (!mpi)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
+ pks->nr_mpi = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request an asymmetric key.
+ */
+static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
+ const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ size_t i;
+ char *id, *q;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len);
+
+ /* Construct an identifier. */
+ id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+
+ memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+
+ q = id + signer_len;
+ *q++ = ':';
+ *q++ = ' ';
+ for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) {
+ *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4];
+ *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f];
+ }
+
+ *q = 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+ id, PTR_ERR(key));
+ kfree(id);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ /* Hide some search errors */
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -ENOTDIR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ default:
+ return ERR_CAST(key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature on a module
+ */
+static int old_mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen,
+ const struct module_signature *ms)
+{
+ struct public_key_signature *pks;
+ struct key *key;
+ const void *sig;
+ size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+
+ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+ if (sig_len >= modlen)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ modlen -= sig_len;
+ if ((size_t)ms->signer_len + ms->key_id_len >= modlen)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ modlen -= (size_t)ms->signer_len + ms->key_id_len;
+
+ *_modlen = modlen;
+ sig = mod + modlen;
+
+ /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */
+ if (ms->algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
+ ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_X509)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ if (ms->hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
+ !hash_algo_name[ms->hash])
+ return -ENOPKG;
+
+ key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms->signer_len,
+ sig + ms->signer_len, ms->key_id_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+ pks = mod_make_digest(ms->hash, mod, modlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
+ goto error_put_key;
+ }
+
+ ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms->signer_len + ms->key_id_len,
+ sig_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_pks;
+
+ ret = verify_signature(key, pks);
+ pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret);
+
+error_free_pks:
+ mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
+ kfree(pks);
+error_put_key:
+ key_put(key);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
--
2.1.4