From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Fri, 28 May 2021 13:47:27 +0000
Subject: bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification
Patch-mainline: v5.13-rc7
Git-commit: fe9a5ca7e370e613a9a75a13008a3845ea759d6e
References: bsc#1187554,CVE-2021-33624
... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given
the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable
from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for
safety regardless.
With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the
patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially
different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are
unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5263,6 +5263,19 @@ do_sim:
return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
}
+static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+
+ /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
+ * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
+ * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
+ * rewrite/sanitize them.
+ */
+ if (!vstate->speculative)
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+}
+
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
@@ -9109,7 +9122,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
- env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+ sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
@@ -9329,7 +9342,7 @@ process_bpf_exit:
return err;
env->insn_idx++;
- env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+ sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -10816,6 +10829,9 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verif
* insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary
* data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be
* run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful.
+ *
+ * Note that special handling is needed on !env->bypass_spec_v1 if this is
+ * ever called outside of error path with subsequent program rejection.
*/
static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{