From 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:15:24 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
Git-commit: 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9
Patch-mainline: v5.1-rc3
References: bsc#1051510

info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
rmidi->streams.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

---
 sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi.c b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
index ee601d7f0926..c0690d1ecd55 100644
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <sound/rawmidi.h>
 #include <sound/info.h>
 #include <sound/control.h>
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card,
 		return -ENXIO;
 	if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2);
 	pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream];
 	if (pstr->substream_count == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
-- 
2.16.4