From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 00:32:06 +0200
Patch-mainline: v5.19-rc1
Subject: PCI: hv: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
Git-commit: 9937fa6d1eb6fac95586970e17617a718919c858
References: bsc#1204017

For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer.  Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the
source buffer in hv_pci_onchannelcallback().

While at it, remove a redundant validation in hv_pci_generic_compl():
hv_pci_onchannelcallback() already ensures that all processed incoming
packets are "at least as large as [in fact larger than] a response".

Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511223207.3386-2-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Olaf Hering <ohering@suse.de>
---
 drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c | 33 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
--- a/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -981,11 +981,7 @@ static void hv_pci_generic_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
 {
 	struct hv_pci_compl *comp_pkt = context;
 
-	if (resp_packet_size >= offsetofend(struct pci_response, status))
-		comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
-	else
-		comp_pkt->completion_status = -1;
-
+	comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
 	complete(&comp_pkt->host_event);
 }
 
@@ -1606,8 +1602,13 @@ static void hv_pci_compose_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
 	struct pci_create_int_response *int_resp =
 		(struct pci_create_int_response *)resp;
 
+	if (resp_packet_size < sizeof(*int_resp)) {
+		comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = resp->status;
 	comp_pkt->int_desc = int_resp->int_desc;
+out:
 	complete(&comp_pkt->comp_pkt.host_event);
 }
 
@@ -2291,12 +2292,14 @@ static void q_resource_requirements(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
 	struct q_res_req_compl *completion = context;
 	struct pci_q_res_req_response *q_res_req =
 		(struct pci_q_res_req_response *)resp;
+	s32 status;
 	int i;
 
-	if (resp->status < 0) {
+	status = (resp_packet_size < sizeof(*q_res_req)) ? -1 : resp->status;
+	if (status < 0) {
 		dev_err(&completion->hpdev->hbus->hdev->device,
 			"query resource requirements failed: %x\n",
-			resp->status);
+			status);
 	} else {
 		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
 			completion->hpdev->probed_bar[i] =
@@ -2848,7 +2851,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
 			case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS:
 
 				bus_rel = (struct pci_bus_relations *)buffer;
-				if (bytes_recvd <
+				if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel) ||
+				    bytes_recvd <
 					struct_size(bus_rel, func,
 						    bus_rel->device_count)) {
 					dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@@ -2862,7 +2866,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
 			case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS2:
 
 				bus_rel2 = (struct pci_bus_relations2 *)buffer;
-				if (bytes_recvd <
+				if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel2) ||
+				    bytes_recvd <
 					struct_size(bus_rel2, func,
 						    bus_rel2->device_count)) {
 					dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@@ -2876,6 +2881,11 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
 			case PCI_EJECT:
 
 				dev_message = (struct pci_dev_incoming *)buffer;
+				if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*dev_message)) {
+					dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
+						"eject message too small\n");
+					break;
+				}
 				hpdev = get_pcichild_wslot(hbus,
 						      dev_message->wslot.slot);
 				if (hpdev) {