From 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 09:35:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size
Git-commit: 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02
Patch-mainline: v5.7-rc2
References: CVE-2020-12659 bsc#1171214

Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available
space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the
headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP
headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported
size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds
write.

Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@intel.com
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

---
 net/xdp/xdp_umem.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c
+++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem
 	u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom;
 	unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page;
 	u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len;
-	int size_chk, err, i;
+	int err, i;
 
 	if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
 		/* Strictly speaking we could support this, if:
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem
 	if (chunks < chunks_per_page || chunks % chunks_per_page)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM;
-	if (size_chk < 0)
+	if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	umem->address = (unsigned long)addr;