From: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 18:38:27 -0500
Subject: libceph: use kernel_connect()
Git-commit: 7563cf17dce0a875ba3d872acdc63a78ea344019
Patch-mainline: v6.6-rc6
References: bsc#1219446
Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when
used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to
kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side
effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with
kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to
ceph_tcp_connect().
This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree
addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect()
throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches
targeting various trees.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/
Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ static int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_
dout("connect %s\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr));
con_sock_state_connecting(con);
- ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss),
- O_NONBLOCK);
+ ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss),
+ O_NONBLOCK);
if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n",
ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr),