From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 18:12:17 +0300
Patch-mainline: v5.1-rc4
Git-commit: 42d8644bd77dd2d747e004e367cb0c895a606f39
References: bsc#1065600
Subject: [PATCH] xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl
The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall().
It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of
bounds access.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
index de6f0d59a24f..2863c2026655 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned int call,
__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
+ if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0]))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
stac();
asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
--
2.16.4