From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 20:11:59 -0800
Subject: bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
Patch-mainline: v4.15-rc5
Git-commit: 179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14
References: CVE-2017-17855 bsc#1056787 bsc#1073928

This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.

Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3302,15 +3302,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state
 			return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
 			       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
 		} else {
-			/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
-			 * equal, because we can't know anything about the
-			 * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
+			/* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.
+			 * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to
+			 * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak
+			 * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in
+			 * special cases if root is calling us, but it's
+			 * probably not worth the hassle.
 			 */
-			return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
-			       rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
-			       rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
-			       rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
-			       tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
+			return false;
 		}
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and