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From b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 10:39:27 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv()
Git-commit: b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d
Patch-mainline: v5.6-rc1
References: CVE-2020-12653 bsc#1171195

mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() calls memcpy() without checking
the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower,
which a local user could use to cause denial of service
or the execution of arbitrary code.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().

Signed-off-by: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
index 98f942b797f7..a7968a84aaf8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c
@@ -2884,6 +2884,13 @@ mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 			vs_param_set->header.len =
 				cpu_to_le16((((u16) priv->vs_ie[id].ie[1])
 				& 0x00FF) + 2);
+			if (le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len) >
+				MWIFIEX_MAX_VSIE_LEN) {
+				mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR,
+					    "Invalid param length!\n");
+				break;
+			}
+
 			memcpy(vs_param_set->ie, priv->vs_ie[id].ie,
 			       le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len));
 			*buffer += le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len) +
-- 
2.16.4