From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Aug 2018 16:07:45 +0200
Subject: x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Git-commit: ea156d192f5257a5bf393d33910d3b481bf8a401
Patch-mainline: v4.19-rc1
References: bsc#1110006
Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:
- If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
same core, and SMT is irrelevant.
- If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"
- Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
and the detail on SMT is second.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index eb4b574be237..b0886bd24164 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -762,9 +762,15 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
- return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",
- l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+ (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+ cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+ cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
#else
static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)