From: Tudor-Dan Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 12:42:18 +0200
Subject: crypto: caam - don't leak pointers to authenc keys
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Git-commit: 61dab9726050b0ffa826f1b540e9518768914b76
Patch-mainline: v4.17-rc1
References: fate#326534

In caam's aead_setkey we save pointers to the authenc keys in a
local variable of type struct crypto_authenc_keys and we don't
zeroize it after use. Fix this and don't leak pointers to the
authenc keys.

Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <yousaf.kaukab@suse.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
index 584a6c183548..7207a535942d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c
@@ -570,9 +570,11 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead,
 
 skip_split_key:
 	ctx->cdata.keylen = keys.enckeylen;
+	memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
 	return aead_set_sh_desc(aead);
 badkey:
 	crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-- 
2.11.0