From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Sat, 25 Aug 2018 22:58:01 -0700
Subject: net: sched: Fix memory exposure from short TCA_U32_SEL
Git-commit: 98c8f125fd8a6240ea343c1aa50a1be9047791b8
Patch-mainline: v4.19-rc2
References: networking-stable-18_09_11

Via u32_change(), TCA_U32_SEL has an unspecified type in the netlink
policy, so max length isn't enforced, only minimum. This means nkeys
(from userspace) was being trusted without checking the actual size of
nla_len(), which could lead to a memory over-read, and ultimately an
exposure via a call to u32_dump(). Reachability is CAP_NET_ADMIN within
a namespace.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
---
 net/sched/cls_u32.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
@@ -850,6 +850,7 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s
 	struct nlattr *opt = tca[TCA_OPTIONS];
 	struct nlattr *tb[TCA_U32_MAX + 1];
 	u32 htid, flags = 0;
+	size_t sel_size;
 	int err;
 #ifdef CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF
 	size_t size;
@@ -970,8 +971,11 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s
 	}
 
 	s = nla_data(tb[TCA_U32_SEL]);
+	sel_size = sizeof(*s) + s->nkeys * sizeof(*s->keys);
+	if (nla_len(tb[TCA_U32_SEL]) < sel_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	n = kzalloc(offsetof(typeof(*n), sel) + sel_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (n == NULL) {
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto erridr;
@@ -984,7 +988,7 @@ static int u32_change(struct net *net, s
 	}
 #endif
 
-	memcpy(&n->sel, s, sizeof(*s) + s->nkeys*sizeof(struct tc_u32_key));
+	memcpy(&n->sel, s, sel_size);
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(n->ht_up, ht);
 	n->handle = handle;
 	n->fshift = s->hmask ? ffs(ntohl(s->hmask)) - 1 : 0;