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From 8211a88534d27ba26d822f6a3109afadface4e67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yuxuan Shui <yshuiv7@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 04:08:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] ovl: initialize error in ovl_copy_xattr
References: bsc#1189846
Patch-mainline: v5.8-rc1
Git-commit: 520da69d265a91c6536c63851cbb8a53946974f0

commit 520da69d265a91c6536c63851cbb8a53946974f0 upstream.

In ovl_copy_xattr, if all the xattrs to be copied are overlayfs private
xattrs, the copy loop will terminate without assigning anything to the
error variable, thus returning an uninitialized value.

If ovl_copy_xattr is called from ovl_clear_empty, this uninitialized error
value is put into a pointer by ERR_PTR(), causing potential invalid memory
accesses down the line.

This commit initialize error with 0. This is the correct value because when
there's no xattr to copy, because all xattrs are private, ovl_copy_xattr
should succeed.

This bug is discovered with the help of INIT_STACK_ALL and clang.

Signed-off-by: Yuxuan Shui <yshuiv7@gmail.com>
Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1050405
Fixes: 0956254a2d5b ("ovl: don't copy up opaqueness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
---
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 091920516f21..506b29e8817c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct dentry *old, struct dentry *new)
 {
 	ssize_t list_size, size, value_size = 0;
 	char *buf, *name, *value = NULL;
-	int uninitialized_var(error);
+	int error = 0;
 	size_t slen;
 
 	if (!(old->d_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
-- 
2.32.0