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From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 15:05:05 +0800
Subject: vhost: fix OOB in get_rx_bufs()
Patch-mainline: v5.0-rc5
Git-commit: b46a0bf78ad7b150ef5910da83859f7f5a514ffd
References: bsc#1122767 CVE-2018-16880

After batched used ring updating was introduced in commit e2b3b35eb989
("vhost_net: batch used ring update in rx"). We tend to batch heads in
vq->heads for more than one packet. But the quota passed to
get_rx_bufs() was not correctly limited, which can result a OOB write
in vq->heads.

        headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads + nvq->done_idx,
                    vhost_len, &in, vq_log, &log,
                    likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);

UIO_MAXIOV was still used which is wrong since we could have batched
used in vq->heads, this will cause OOB if the next buffer needs more
than 960 (1024 (UIO_MAXIOV) - 64 (VHOST_NET_BATCH)) heads after we've
batched 64 (VHOST_NET_BATCH) heads:
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-8k (Tainted: G    B            ): Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

INFO: 0x00000000fd93b7a2-0x00000000f0713384. First byte 0xa9 instead of 0xcc
INFO: Allocated in alloc_pd+0x22/0x60 age=3933677 cpu=2 pid=2674
    kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xbb/0x140
    alloc_pd+0x22/0x60
    gen8_ppgtt_create+0x11d/0x5f0
    i915_ppgtt_create+0x16/0x80
    i915_gem_create_context+0x248/0x390
    i915_gem_context_create_ioctl+0x4b/0xe0
    drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0xf0
    drm_ioctl+0x2ed/0x3a0
    do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f/0x620
    ksys_ioctl+0x6b/0x80
    __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20
    do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
INFO: Slab 0x00000000d13e87af objects=3 used=3 fp=0x          (null) flags=0x200000000010201
INFO: Object 0x0000000003278802 @offset=17064 fp=0x00000000e2e6652b

Fixing this by allocating UIO_MAXIOV + VHOST_NET_BATCH iovs for
vhost-net. This is done through set the limitation through
vhost_dev_init(), then set_owner can allocate the number of iov in a
per device manner.

This fixes CVE-2018-16880.

Fixes: e2b3b35eb989 ("vhost_net: batch used ring update in rx")
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
---
 drivers/vhost/net.c   |    3 ++-
 drivers/vhost/scsi.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c |   14 +++++++++-----
 drivers/vhost/vhost.h |    4 +++-
 drivers/vhost/vsock.c |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -1289,7 +1289,8 @@ static int vhost_net_open(struct inode *
 		n->vqs[i].rx_ring = NULL;
 		vhost_net_buf_init(&n->vqs[i].rxq);
 	}
-	vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX);
+	vhost_dev_init(dev, vqs, VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX,
+		       UIO_MAXIOV + VHOST_NET_BATCH);
 
 	vhost_poll_init(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX, handle_tx_net, POLLOUT, dev);
 	vhost_poll_init(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_RX, handle_rx_net, POLLIN, dev);
--- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
@@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ static int vhost_scsi_open(struct inode
 		vqs[i] = &vs->vqs[i].vq;
 		vs->vqs[i].vq.handle_kick = vhost_scsi_handle_kick;
 	}
-	vhost_dev_init(&vs->dev, vqs, VHOST_SCSI_MAX_VQ);
+	vhost_dev_init(&vs->dev, vqs, VHOST_SCSI_MAX_VQ, UIO_MAXIOV);
 
 	vhost_scsi_init_inflight(vs, NULL);
 
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -390,10 +390,13 @@ static long vhost_dev_alloc_iovecs(struc
 
 	for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
 		vq = dev->vqs[i];
-		vq->indirect = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->indirect * UIO_MAXIOV,
-				       GFP_KERNEL);
-		vq->log = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->log * UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
-		vq->heads = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->heads * UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
+		vq->indirect = kmalloc_array(UIO_MAXIOV,
+					     sizeof(*vq->indirect),
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
+		vq->log = kmalloc_array(dev->iov_limit, sizeof(*vq->log),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+		vq->heads = kmalloc_array(dev->iov_limit, sizeof(*vq->heads),
+					  GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!vq->indirect || !vq->log || !vq->heads)
 			goto err_nomem;
 	}
@@ -414,7 +417,7 @@ static void vhost_dev_free_iovecs(struct
 }
 
 void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *dev,
-		    struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs, int nvqs)
+		    struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs, int nvqs, int iov_limit)
 {
 	struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
 	int i;
@@ -428,6 +431,7 @@ void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *de
 	dev->iotlb = NULL;
 	dev->mm = NULL;
 	dev->worker = NULL;
+	dev->iov_limit = iov_limit;
 	init_llist_head(&dev->work_list);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&dev->wait);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->read_list);
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.h
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.h
@@ -179,9 +179,11 @@ struct vhost_dev {
 	struct list_head read_list;
 	struct list_head pending_list;
 	wait_queue_head_t wait;
+	int iov_limit;
 };
 
-void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs, int nvqs);
+void vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue **vqs,
+		    int nvqs, int iov_limit);
 long vhost_dev_set_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev);
 bool vhost_dev_has_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev);
 long vhost_dev_check_owner(struct vhost_dev *);
--- a/drivers/vhost/vsock.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vsock.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int vhost_vsock_dev_open(struct i
 	vsock->vqs[VSOCK_VQ_TX].handle_kick = vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick;
 	vsock->vqs[VSOCK_VQ_RX].handle_kick = vhost_vsock_handle_rx_kick;
 
-	vhost_dev_init(&vsock->dev, vqs, ARRAY_SIZE(vsock->vqs));
+	vhost_dev_init(&vsock->dev, vqs, ARRAY_SIZE(vsock->vqs), UIO_MAXIOV);
 
 	file->private_data = vsock;
 	spin_lock_init(&vsock->send_pkt_list_lock);