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From: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 May 2022 16:36:27 +0000
Subject: Documentation: virt: Protected virtual machine dumps
Git-commit: 660a28653d839b70949087d2662e140cc511b363
Patch-mainline: v6.0-rc1
References: jsc#PED-622

Let's add a documentation file which describes the dump process. Since
we only copy the UV dump data from the UV to userspace we'll not go
into detail here and let the party which processes the data describe
its structure.

Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-10-frankja@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-10-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
[ Documentation added to Documentation/virt/kvm, because SLE15-SP5 does
  not contain upstream commit daec8d408308ee7322d86cdd2dc3332e9cdbedf9. ]
Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst        |    1 
 Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-dump.rst |   64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ KVM
    s390-diag
    s390-pv
    s390-pv-boot
+   s390-pv-dump
    timekeeping
    vcpu-requests
 
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-dump.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+===========================================
+s390 (IBM Z) Protected Virtualization dumps
+===========================================
+
+Summary
+-------
+
+Dumping a VM is an essential tool for debugging problems inside
+it. This is especially true when a protected VM runs into trouble as
+there's no way to access its memory and registers from the outside
+while it's running.
+
+However when dumping a protected VM we need to maintain its
+confidentiality until the dump is in the hands of the VM owner who
+should be the only one capable of analysing it.
+
+The confidentiality of the VM dump is ensured by the Ultravisor who
+provides an interface to KVM over which encrypted CPU and memory data
+can be requested. The encryption is based on the Customer
+Communication Key which is the key that's used to encrypt VM data in a
+way that the customer is able to decrypt.
+
+
+Dump process
+------------
+
+A dump is done in 3 steps:
+
+**Initiation**
+
+This step initializes the dump process, generates cryptographic seeds
+and extracts dump keys with which the VM dump data will be encrypted.
+
+**Data gathering**
+
+Currently there are two types of data that can be gathered from a VM:
+the memory and the vcpu state.
+
+The vcpu state contains all the important registers, general, floating
+point, vector, control and tod/timers of a vcpu. The vcpu dump can
+contain incomplete data if a vcpu is dumped while an instruction is
+emulated with help of the hypervisor. This is indicated by a flag bit
+in the dump data. For the same reason it is very important to not only
+write out the encrypted vcpu state, but also the unencrypted state
+from the hypervisor.
+
+The memory state is further divided into the encrypted memory and its
+metadata comprised of the encryption tweaks and status flags. The
+encrypted memory can simply be read once it has been exported. The
+time of the export does not matter as no re-encryption is
+needed. Memory that has been swapped out and hence was exported can be
+read from the swap and written to the dump target without need for any
+special actions.
+
+The tweaks / status flags for the exported pages need to be requested
+from the Ultravisor.
+
+**Finalization**
+
+The finalization step will provide the data needed to be able to
+decrypt the vcpu and memory data and end the dump process. When this
+step completes successfully a new dump initiation can be started.