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From: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 16:26:53 -0800
Subject: ice: rename ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT to avoid confusion
Patch-mainline: v5.18-rc1
Git-commit: dc36796eadcae0e239fc4f42cafd12f46290fbdd
References: jsc#PED-376

The ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT field is defined in ice_sriov.h. This count is true
for SR-IOV but will not be true for all VF implementations, such as when
the ice driver supports Scalable IOV.

Rename this definition to clearly indicate ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c |    8 ++++----
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
@@ -3754,7 +3754,7 @@ static void ice_set_pf_caps(struct ice_p
 	if (func_caps->common_cap.sr_iov_1_1) {
 		set_bit(ICE_FLAG_SRIOV_CAPABLE, pf->flags);
 		pf->vfs.num_supported = min_t(int, func_caps->num_allocd_vfs,
-					      ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT);
+					      ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS);
 	}
 	clear_bit(ICE_FLAG_RSS_ENA, pf->flags);
 	if (func_caps->common_cap.rss_table_size)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf)
 
 		/* clear malicious info since the VF is getting released */
 		if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs,
-					ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT, vf->vf_id))
+					ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id))
 			dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n",
 				vf->vf_id);
 
@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ bool ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf
 	/* clear all malicious info if the VFs are getting reset */
 	ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf)
 		if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs,
-					ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT, vf->vf_id))
+					ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id))
 			dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n",
 				vf->vf_id);
 
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ bool ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, boo
 
 	/* if the VF has been reset allow it to come up again */
 	if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs,
-				ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT, vf->vf_id))
+				ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id))
 		dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", i);
 
 	return true;
@@ -6624,7 +6624,7 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, s
 		 * know about it, then let them know now
 		 */
 		status = ice_mbx_report_malvf(&pf->hw, pf->vfs.malvfs,
-					      ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT, vf_id,
+					      ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf_id,
 					      &report_vf);
 		if (status)
 			dev_dbg(dev, "Error reporting malicious VF\n");
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #define ICE_PCI_CIAD_WAIT_DELAY_US	1
 
 /* VF resource constraints */
-#define ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT		256
+#define ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS		256
 #define ICE_MIN_QS_PER_VF		1
 #define ICE_NONQ_VECS_VF		1
 #define ICE_MAX_RSS_QS_PER_VF		16
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct ice_vfs {
 	u16 num_qps_per;		/* number of queue pairs per VF */
 	u16 num_msix_per;		/* number of MSI-X vectors per VF */
 	unsigned long last_printed_mdd_jiffies;	/* MDD message rate limit */
-	DECLARE_BITMAP(malvfs, ICE_MAX_VF_COUNT); /* malicious VF indicator */
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(malvfs, ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS); /* malicious VF indicator */
 };
 
 /* VF information structure */