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From fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 00:16:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
Git-commit: fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66
Patch-mainline: v5.6-rc3
References: bsc#1166871

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

---
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 216fbe6a4837..4dc09638de8f 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Tag 1 packet contains key larger "
 		       "than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free;
 	}
 	memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.encrypted_key,
 	       &data[(*packet_size)], (body_size - (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 2)));
-- 
2.16.4