From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 22:28:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragopt
References: bnc#1060662 CVE-2017-7542 bsc#1049882
Patch-mainline: v4.12.6
Git-commit: 6399f1fae4ec29fab5ec76070435555e256ca3a6

[ Upstream commit 6399f1fae4ec29fab5ec76070435555e256ca3a6 ]

In some cases, offset can overflow and can cause an infinite loop in
ip6_find_1stfragopt(). Make it unsigned int to prevent the overflow, and
cap it at IPV6_MAXPLEN, since packets larger than that should be invalid.

This problem has been here since before the beginning of git history.

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
---
 net/ipv6/output_core.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/output_core.c b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
index e9065b8d3af8..abb2c307fbe8 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_select_ident);
 
 int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr)
 {
-	u16 offset = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+	unsigned int offset = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
 	unsigned int packet_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) -
 		skb_network_header(skb);
 	int found_rhdr = 0;
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr)
 
 	while (offset <= packet_len) {
 		struct ipv6_opt_hdr *exthdr;
+		unsigned int len;
 
 		switch (**nexthdr) {
 
@@ -111,7 +112,10 @@ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr)
 
 		exthdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) +
 						 offset);
-		offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr);
+		len = ipv6_optlen(exthdr);
+		if (len + offset >= IPV6_MAXPLEN)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		offset += len;
 		*nexthdr = &exthdr->nexthdr;
 	}
 
-- 
2.14.2